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ABSTRACT. The management of small-scale artisanal fisheries in Brazil should be a priority because of
their importance as a source of food for internal markets and their location in sites with high biodiversity,
such as the Atlantic Forest coast. Fishing spots, territories, and sea tenure have been widely studied within
artisanal fisheries, and, in this study, a fishing spot of this type may be a defended area or an area that
imposes rules for users, making the exclusion of outsiders feasible, or even a place in which fishing occurs
with some exclusivity. This analysis takes into account the importance of fishing areas for the conservation
of artisanal fishing in Brazil and the relative temporal stability of these areas. In particular, examples of
the use of the marine space on the coast of Brazil in areas such as Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Bahia
States are presented. Fishing spots used by artisanal fishers were marked using a Global Positioning System
(GPS). An informal division of the marine space and high temporal stability, often in the range of 10–30
yr, in the use of the fishing spots were found. For some fishing areas, information published in the 1960s
provided a relevant comparison for the current use of the fishing spots at sea. Such information is very
helpful for the management of artisanal fishing in Brazil because tourism has increased in some areas,
recreational fishers have been fishing in marine spots used by artisanal fishers, and industrial fishers are
spread over a wide range of the marine space in these coastal waters. This stability in the use of marine
space among artisanal fishers plus local rules support the case for local co-management of artisanal fisheries.
Reserving areas for artisanal fishers and understanding the behavior of other users are essential aspects for
the management and conservation of artisanal fishing in Brazil.
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INTRODUCTION
The management of coastal waters should be a
priority in Brazil, considering the number of small-
scale fisheries along its coast and the importance of
artisanal fishing as a source of food for the Brazilian
population. Coastal artisanal fisheries in Brazil are
an important source of employment and food for
local communities, contributing 40–60% of marine
fish production (Silvano 2004). Many small
communities, such as those along the Atlantic Forest
coast, rely on fish as a source of protein, because
fish represent 50–68% of the animal protein in their
diet (Begossi et al. 2000). Other authors have
stressed the importance of local coastal artisanal
fishers and of their conservation (Diegues 1983).
One of the crucial aspects of the mechanisms for
conserving natural resources in fisheries, other than
monitoring species and regulating the gear used, is
controlling the space used by fishers, including their
capacity to exclude outsiders. This is especially true
when we observe that other coastal fisheries in the
world have control of the space they use. For
example, the Japanese coastal fisheries have
controlled their shores since 1902, when village sea
territories were mapped and registered in the
Okinawa prefectural fisheries office (Akimichi and
Ruddle 1984). In addition to controlling the marine
space as a prerequisite for success, resource
management should be able to set access limits on
resources and restrict harvesting. In other words, it
is important to define who is going to fish, how much
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fish will be taken out, and which species are
targeted.
Territoriality has been one of the classic behaviors
among fishers that has helped to exclude outsiders
and maintain aquatic resource availability for the
local artisanal fisheries. Territories have been
owned or defended by families, groups,
communities, and villages, among others, as shown
by Forman (1967), Acheson (1972), Berkes (1985),
McCay and Acheson (1987), and among Brazilian
fishers, as shown by Cordell (1985, 1989), Begossi
(1995, 1998a, 2001a,b, 2004a), and Seixas and
Begossi (1998). Definitions of the Brazilian
pesqueiro, a fishing spot with some type of tenure,
as well as differences in territories and fishing areas
are found in Cordell (1989) and in Begossi (2004a).
Many authors have shed light on analyses of the
management of the commons (McCay and Acheson
1987), on different kinds of management regimes
and property rights (Berkes 1989), and on research
programs and theoretical insights concerning
institutions and collective actions for the
management of natural resources (Ostrom 1990).
Reviews of the theory and analytical tools related
to the management of common-pool resources are
found in Feeny et al. (1990), Ruttan (1998), Burke
(2001), and Dietz et al. (2002). As suggested by
Agrawal (2002), difficulties in managing common-
pool resources occur when there are many users,
when boundaries are unclear, and when users are
scattered over a large area.
In spite of the observation by Burger et al. (2001)
that the spatial scale of the resource, the temporal
scale, and especially the congruence between the
scales of the system and of the jurisdictions are
important factors when making decisions about
management and governance, considerations of
time are often absent in the literature. In a literature
review by Agrawal (2002), in which the various
conditions necessary for the sustainability of a
common management are cited, the temporal
stability of local rules or institutions is not taken into
account. The instability of institutions, including
their possible temporal shifts, is one of the factors
of uncertainty. However, uncertainty in the
literature is often related to environmental
uncertainty (Kopelman et al. 2002), especially in
marine fisheries (Wilson 2002), but not necessarily
to institutional uncertainty. More recently, a study
that looked at temporal and spatial scales in the
context of social memory, adaptive learning, and
local institutions was conducted among the
Anishinaabe people of Ontario, Canada (Davidson-
Hunt and Berkes 2003).
The temporal scale as it relates to the existence of
local rules and institutions in the use of resources is
seldom taken into account in studies, because
comparative temporal data are especially difficult
to obtain. Most small-scale fisheries are located in
developing countries, and data on fish landings and
fishing spots used are often unavailable. There are,
of course, exceptions. For example, in Jamaica,
fishery surveys are carried out every 10 yr (Berkes
et al. 2000). Such information, or comparable
information obtained from diachronic data, is key
and much needed to verify the possibilities of a co-
management process. In a community whose
fishing areas and rules change often, it is difficult
to get fishers and environmental agents involved in
co-management, because the rules and areas used
are not clearly defined.
Berkes (1985) provides information on some of the
mechanisms used by fishers to control resources at
many different territorial levels and for many
fisheries in the world, including individual or family
parcels in Mexico, licensed individual use rights in
Canada, and territories controlled by longhouses in
Borneo. Other classical studies on territorial
behaviors include a group of lobster fishers, i.e., the
harbor gangs, on the coast of Maine, USA. Their
territorial system was the result of competition
between groups of lobster fishers (Acheson 1972,
1981, 1987). Acheson (1997) also obtained
comparative historical data and records for in-depth
analyses of the lobster fishery in Maine, including
its economical cycles and recoveries.
In Brazil, data on coastal fisheries, especially on fish
landings and fishing grounds, have been collected
in research projects since 1985 (Begossi 1998a, 
2001a,b). In the present study, we obtained data
from Bahia, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro; these
can be compared to other data collected at different
sites over 10–30 yr (Fig. 1). The major objective of
this study was to analyze stability in the use of
fishing spots as an incipient or local rule for the
coastal artisanal fisheries and as an important
mechanism that could support the conservation of
fishing areas in these small-scale communities.
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Fig. 1. Research sites in Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo States, Brazil.
Fishing communities, local rules, and sites
In coastal Brazil, the control of marine space by
local artisanal fishers is often difficult to observe
because of the absence of direct or apparent conflicts
among users from coastal communities. However,
a division of the marine space is apparent, perhaps
as a result of the restrictions imposed by simple
technologies, e.g., motorized and paddled canoes,
or as an outcome of previous conflicts, or even as a
precautionary behavior that guarantees the
extraction of fish by each of the small-scale fishing
communities along the coast. Thus, even indirectly,
fishers have shown the existence of informal or
customary mechanisms for sharing the use of
marine space (Begossi 2001a,b, 2004a). For
example, artisanal fisher technology, mostly
represented by paddled or motorized canoes or
aluminum boats, restricts fisher mobility. As a
consequence, fishing usually occurs in spots located
close to the fishers’ residences. At the same time,
some distant fishing spots are occasionally shared
by fishers from different fishing communities and,
in this case, no conflicts are observed, because such
spots are used only sporadically. This behavior is
shown by fishers from the coast of Rio de Janeiro
who belong to the jurisdiction of the fishing
associations of Copacabana (Nehrer and Begossi
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2000) and the Itaipu beaches of Colônia de
Pescadores Z-13 and Z-7; the Rasa and Redonda
Islands are sporadically frequented by fishers from
both communities (Fig. 2).
However, the occurrence of incipient accords,
customary laws, or local rules may not be enough
to guarantee the conservation of fishing areas. The
conservation of artisanal fisheries depends, among
others things, on the capacity to exclude outsiders
and to create institutions that assimilate local rules
for the use of marine space. Acheson and Knight
(2000) suggest that social conventions emerge
because of the need to coordinate activities. Such a
capacity might be associated with (1) the degree of
cohesion and robustness of local organizations,
including their ability to defend the marine space,
e.g., through territories, and (2) interactions or
communications with government agencies in
support of local initiatives and the ability to form a
basis for co-management. According to Jentoft
(2003), such a concept is broad, but it represents a
collaborative and participatory process of
regulatory decision making among representatives
of user groups, government agencies, research
institutions, and other stakeholders. Examples of
interactions between government institutions and
local fishers in Latin America are given in Begossi
and Brown (2003).
The division of space for fishing is a necessary
condition for avoiding conflicts over resources,
because it minimizes overlap in the search for
resources. However, the division of space alone is
not enough to conserve resources, unless such use
is stable over time. For this reason, even though
Brazilian artisanal coastal fishers have some
informal division in the use of the local fishing spots
(Begossi 2001a,b) and the most frequently used
spots are those located close to residences, there was
a need to determine whether the locations of the
fishing spots changed over time. Therefore, three
coastal Brazilian areas were studied. The first, the
fishing village of Valença, was also studied by
Cordell (1974, 1978, 1985, 1989) in the 1960s; it is
located on the northeastern coast of Brazil, in Bahia
State. The second community, Itaipu Beach, which
we studied from 2001 to 2003, is located in the city
of Niterói, Rio de Janeiro State (Figs. 1 and 2). This
area was also studied in the 1970s by Lima and
Pereira (1997). The third area includes communities
from the Ubatuba district on the coast of the State
of São Paulo, i.e., Puruba and Picinguaba Beaches.
These were studied in 1992–1993 (Begossi 1995,
1998a). In the present study, I show that the spots
used for fishing today are the same as those used in
the past; thus, they are stable over time.
METHODS
After interviews with fishers and after choosing an
experienced fisher as an informant, the fishing spots
were marked in the three areas studied. Data on
fishing and on the community were available from
the results of earlier studies in Valença, Bahia
(Cordell 1974, 1978, 1989); in Itaipu, Rio de Janeiro
(Lima and Pereira 1997, Barbosa et al. 2004,
Begossi 2004a); and in Puruba and Picinguaba, São
Paulo (Begossi 1995, 1998a,b, 2004a,b, Lopes
2004).
Fieldwork was carried out in the three coastal areas
between 2001 and 2003. To mark the locations of
the fishing spots, i.e., the pesqueiros, a GPS Garmin
III + and Garmin V were used at Itaipu and Valença,
and Puruba Beach, respectively. At Valença, Bahia,
and Itaipu Beach, Rio de Janeiro, procedures
included interviews using open-ended questionnaires;
the data collected included each fisher’s name,
occupation, age, type of fishing gear used, prey
captured, and the locations of fishing spots used,
among other information. Data from Valença were
collected during one visit in February 2002, fish
were collected for identification, and fishers from
the neighborhood of Tento were interviewed. The
choice to interview fishers from Tento came after
preliminary interviews at Valença, which identified
Tento as the place in which most local fishers live
and land their fish. Interviews were performed using
the snowball method (Bailey 1978) in which, at the
end of each interview, fishers were asked to give
the name(s) of other fishers who had experience and
knowledge in the field. Using this method, I
interviewed 18 fishers in the neighborhood of Tento.
The fishing association, Colônia de Pescadores
Z-15, is located in Tento and has a small port in the
estuary in which one of the landing points was
located. A sketch from Cordell (1989) was used to
verify the use of the 258 fishing spots that were cited
in the studies he carried out in the 1960s. After
interviewing 18 local fishers, three experienced
fishers were selected to follow us by boat to mark
the spots used to fish. To analyze the adequacy of
the sample of fishers taken, a graphic analysis of the
sampling effort was plotted (Fig. 3). Figure 3 shows
that the sampling effort should have been greater,
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Fig. 2. Fishing spots used by fishers from Copacabana Beach, marked in 1998 at Colônia de Pescadores
Z-13, Rio de Janeiro State, and Itaipu Beach, marked in 2002–2003 at Colônia de Pescadores Z-7, Niterói,
Rio de Janeiro State.
because the sigmoid curve is still increasing and the
addition of other interviews would have increased
the number of spots cited. However, this problem
was solved when the 258 fishing spots listed by
Cordell (1989) were presented to the fishers during
interviews, after they had listed the main spots
currently used.
At Colônia de Pescadores Z-7 in Itaipu Beach,
Niterói, the research project included the sampling
of fish caught at landing points, fish collection to
identify species, and the characterization of the
fishery. Monthly visits to Itaipu Beach were made
between December 2001 and April 2003, with the
exception of August 2002. In addition to the
collection of data at the main landing point on Itaipu
Beach, data were collected directly, using a boat,
from the areas in which fishing activities occurred,
a method I refer to as the “fishing approach.” This
approach consists of marking the coordinates of
each spot using a GPS and acquiring data, e.g., time,
fish caught, location name, on fishing activity when
fishers are at sea. Using this method, together with
interviews done at landing points on Itaipu Beach,
data on the spots most frequently used and on 68
fishing trips during the months of January,
February, March, September, and October 2002
were obtained. In this community, fish landings,
technology, species caught, and the use of marine
areas by fishers were studied. Following the analysis
of the sampling effort for Valença, the relationship
between the numbers of spots sampled and the
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Fig. 3. The cumulative number of new fishing spots given in interviews vs. sampling effort in Valença,
Bahia State, and Itaipu, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro State.
numbers of interviewees was plotted (Fig. 3). In the
case of Itaipu, the sampling effort was sufficient, as
can be seen in Fig. 3. No matter how many
interviewees I added, the number of spots tended to
remain constant.
Data at Puruba and Picinguaba Beaches were
collected during earlier research projects in 1992–
1993 and during other visits to these small villages,
with particular attention to data on the use of the
fishing space in April and December 2003. During
the visit to Puruba, an experienced fisher known
from the previous research carried out there agreed
to follow us in a boat to mark the current fishing
spots used for local fishing. Earlier information on
the Puruba Beach small-scale fishing community
and on the use of its fishing space is published in
Begossi (1995,1998b). In Picinguaba, spots were
marked using information provided by just one
fisher. After it was noticed that only a few spots had
been marked, the information was checked with
another fisher who marked very few additional
spots. For these two communities, data on fishing
spot names were available and collected during
earlier projects; these were used to produce maps of
the fishing spots currently used (Begossi 1995,
1998a). After the study at Puruba and Picinguaba,
a neighboring beach, Almada community, was
included to acquire information on the use of fishing
spots with the help of an informant (Fig. 1).
RESULTS
The mechanisms of spot division by artisanal fishers
to determine the use of the marine space by fishers
from Itaipu Beach, Niterói, and Copacabana, Rio de
Janeiro, are illustrated in Fig. 2. Earlier studies on
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artisanal fishers from Copacabana Beach were
conducted by Nehrer (1997) and by Nehrer and
Begossi (2000). Founded in 1923, the Colônia de
Pescadores Z-13 is one of the oldest fishermen’s
associations in Rio de Janeiro State (Nehrer and
Begossi 2000).
In Fig. 2, it can be observed that the two artisanal
fishing communities are located at opposite ends of
Guanabara Bay, and most of the spots used are close
to the fishing associations, Copacabana and Itaipu,
or the fishers’ residences. Exceptions include
distant spots, such as Rasa and Redonda Islands
(Fig. 2), which are used sporadically by fishers from
both communities. These results reinforce the
findings of earlier studies carried out in other
Atlantic coastal communities (Begossi 2001a,b),
which demonstrate that there is an informal division
of spots among fishers and that this may be useful
for conservation, because it represents a
nonoverlapping process in the extraction of fish
resources.
Local rules on the use of the marine space, i.e., forms
of sea tenure, were observed in earlier studies or
during the data collection phase of the current study.
In Valença, Bahia, Cordell (1989) observed no
formal status in the forms of sea tenure; instead, he
noted that the use of the marine space was regulated
by an honor code that the fishers called respeito, 
meaning social respect. At Itaipu Beach, Lima and
Pereira (1997) observed "First Comer’s Rules," a
behavior that is still seen today. At Puruba, rights
acquired by the frequency of use of some spots by
the same fishers were observed (Begossi 1998a),
and these rights seem to have been maintained
within the same family 10 yr later (Lopes 2004). At
Picinguaba, no reference to local rules could be
found during this study or in earlier research in that
area (Begossi 1995).
The temporal stability of fishing spots used by
the coastal artisanal fishers
Valença, Bahia State
Cordell (1989) recorded the fishing spots used by
fishers in Valença during the 1970s. In these earlier
studies, he analyzed the behavior of fishers toward
the local ecological conditions such as high tide
variations in the Valença estuary (Cordell 1978),
carrying capacity (Cordell 1974), and territoriality,
i.e., sea tenure (Cordell 1989).
Nowadays, Valença’s artisanal fishers often use
nets to catch shrimp and fish. The nets used most
often for fishing during the period studied by
Cordell (1989), the rede de calão, is a type of
shallow-water purse seine that is still used for fish.
However, shrimp fishing has increased over the past
few years; locally, the net used for shrimp is called
a redinha. Although the fishing techniques are
similar, the redinha is smaller than the calão, 
measuring 50–60 m in length, whereas the calão is
more than 200 m long (Begossi 2004a).
Nevertheless, the same spots are used in net fishing
for both shrimp and fish, except that the redinha is
used over a smaller area.
Data collected during interviews (Table 1) and by
the two local informants who went with us by boat,
pointing out each spot used in "Valença 2," are
shown on the map in Fig. 4. I observed that the spots
were the same as those sketched by Cordell (1989),
and that, aside from some changes in the fishery
such as the inclusion of shrimp fishing using the
redinha, the known and used spots had not changed
over time. These results show that these fishing
spots have been used for more than 30 yr.
To be sure about the locations and the use of spots,
I marked the locations a second time with the
assistance of an informant who fishes in Valença
with a hook and line, rather than using the calão 
technique (Fig. 4). In Fig. 4, the areas marked with
this informant included only some of the fishing
spots used for net fishing with the calão, according
to Cordell (1989), and with the common shrimp net
or redinha, as observed in the present study. We
note in Table 1 that the fisher who used the spots
just for line fishing had knowledge of only 14% of
the spots. This is understandable, because Cordell’s
study focused on fishing with the calão and did not
examine hook and line fishing. Thus, the spots that
he recorded were used essentially for the calão and
are currently used for shrimp net fishing with the
redinha as well. However, these spots are not used
for line fishing (Fig. 4.).
About 20 km from Valença, there is a small fishing
community called Guaibim where lobster is one of
the targets. I interviewed a local fisher and asked
him about the 258 spots indicated in Cordell's study
(1989), but he had knowledge of only 12% of them,
all of which were located near Guaibim (Fig. 4).
Such results reinforce the conclusions that:
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Table 1. Results of interviews in the neighborhood of Tento in Valença, Bahia State, Brazil. Fishers 4, 5,
and 14 were informants who helped to mark the fishing spots by boat. The fishers who were not born in
Valença lived there between the ages of 15 and 56.
2 59 100 Shrimp net Camamú, Bahia
3 38 95 beach seine Valença
4 68 95 Fish net Nilo Peçanha, Bahia
5 65 91 Shrimp net N. da Rainha, Bahia
6 62 91 Shrimp net Valença
7 51 91 Shrimp net Valença
8 70 90 Shrimp net Valença
9 64 84 Shrimp net Valença
10† 72 75 Shrimp and fish net, beach seine Valença
11† 65 74 Shrimp and fish net Valença
12 38 68 Fish net Itamarí, Bahia
13 42 64 Shrimp net Valença
14 42 51 Hook and line fishing Ituberá, Bahia
15 32 51 Shrimp net Valença
16 68 47 Fish net Valença
17 39 39 Fish net Valença
18 44 14 Hook and line fishing Camamú, Bahia
† Ex-fisher, retired from fishing.
● fishers who use the calão or redinha nets at
Valença fish mostly at spots that were
registered by Cordell and also marked with a
GPS and mapped in this study. These spots
are located mostly within the Valença
estuary;
 
●  the high temporal stability of spots at Valença
corresponds to the use of these spots for more
than 30 yr, i.e., since the 1960s, when Cordell
collected the data; and
 
● fishers in Valença and Guaibim in Bahia, as
in other communities, tend to fish near their
residences. This behavior represents a
nonoverlapping use of the aquatic space to
obtain resources, especially shrimp, fish, and
lobster.
 
Another interesting observation in the study at
Valença, Bahia, is that age is an important factor
affecting the knowledge of fishing spots. As seen in
Table 1, this type of a relationship is well illustrated
by the linear regression between the number of spots
known by fishers (y) and their ages (x), where y =
33.15 + 2.78x, R2 = 0.49, df = 17, p < 0.01 (Begossi
2004a).
Itaipu Beach, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro State
In the other community studied, Itaipu Beach,
Niterói, Rio de Janeiro State, fishers often use a hook
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Fig. 4. Fishing spots marked by two informants in Valença, Bahia State, sites Valença 1 and 2, and Guaibim,
Bahia State in 2002.
and line to catch fish, squid, (Loligo spp.), and
cutlass fish or espada (Trichiurus lepturus), and
they use gillnets and beach seines to catch other
species such as Sciaenidae. Fishing occurs mostly
at sea for fish and squid, but some shrimp fishing
also takes place in the Itaipu Lagoon. Of the 142
fishing trips sampled, 100 used a hook and line,
including hooks for fish and squid.
At Itaipu Beach, Rio de Janeiro, some spots have
been used for more than 30 yr; a sketch drawn by
Lima and Pereira (1997) based on data collected in
approximately 1977 shows that the fishing areas are
essentially the same when compared with those
marked in 2002–2003 in this study (Fig. 2). The
names of these fishing spots, along with the sketch
by Lima and Pereira (1977) that includes the names
of 64 fishing spots, were shown to the fishers during
their interviews. Most interviewees recognized the
majority of the fishing spots and considered them
to be currently in use (Table 2).
Data collected at landing points from 142 fishing
trips and from 68 approaches by boat to fishers
during their fishing trips, when the current spot used
to fish was marked, show that the three islands
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Table 2. Results of interviews performed at Itaipu, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro State, Brazil.




Place of birth Fishing gear
or
technique used
1 40 100 25 Rio do Ouro  ...
2 38 100 12 Itaipu Fish set gillnet
3 64 98 52 Itaipu Line for squid
and fish
4 48 92 38 Itaipu Fish set gillnet




6 30 90 22 Pendotiba  ...
7 64 89 57 Cafubá  ...
8 47 85 20 Niterói Line for squid
and fish
9  ... 85 15–20 Alcântara Line for squid
and fish
10 48 84 30 Niterói Line for squid
and fish
11 45 84 30 Niterói Beach seine
12 27 82 15 Itaipu  ...
13 37 79 25 Rio do Ouro Fish set gillnet
14 30 79 10 Itaipu Line for squid
and fish
15 45 77 30 Niterói Line for squid
and fish
16 42 77 15 Rio do Ouro Line for squid
and fish
17 42 69 19 Itaipu Line and
diving
18 53 62 27 Itaipu Fish set gillnet
closest to Itaipu Beach are the sites most often
exploited. These are the Ilha Filha, also called the
Ilha Menina and the Pimenta, the Ilha da Mãe, and
the Ilha do Pai, commonly called the Primeira,
Segunda, and Terceira, or First, Second, and Third
Islands, respectively (Fig. 2). These islands
included 81 of the 210 fishing trips in samples taken
at landing points in 2002 that used the fishing
approach method.
In further interviews carried out at landing points
with the participation of 48 fishers, some 59 spots
were cited as commonly used. In 17 of these
citations, the three islands were grouped together;
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individually, First Island was cited seven times,
Second Island seven times, and Third Island 11
times. The spots located at Itacoatiara Beach, the
next beach to the north, were recognized by fishers
(Table 1) and used in 22 of 210 fishing trips. Among
the 59 spots mentioned in interviews, the spots cited
by at least 10 fishers were the four mentioned above,
along with Itaipuaçú and Rasa Islands (Fig. 2). This
distant island, in spite of being mentioned in
interviews as a visited site, was visited only four
times. Redonda Island (Fig. 2) was mentioned by
three fishers during the interviews. These results
show that distant spots are used less frequently than
those that are closer, such as the three islands
mentioned above, and that the fishing spots used by
fishers from Itaipu, listed by Lima and Pereira
(1997) 30 yr ago, are still being used by the
community of fishers from Itaipu Beach, Niterói.
Puruba and Picinguaba, Ubatuba, São Paulo State
Puruba Beach has a fishery that is dedicated
especially to line fishing. It is located between two
small rivers that run from the Atlantic Forest to the
sea: the Puruba and the Quiririm. Fishing in 1992–
1993 was for both subsistence and sale (Begossi
1995), but, according to recent data (Lopes 2004),
fishing now occurs only for subsistence; catches
include snook, mullets, and catfish, among others.
In 1998, a sketch of eight fishing spots was made
based on data obtained from 193 fishing trips
(Begossi 1998a). The marking of fishing spots in
2003, with the help of a fisher informant who was
fishing in 1992–1993 and still fishes, confirms that
the main spots used are mostly the same (Fig. 5).
Lopes (2004) compared fish production and the use
of spots for the two sets of data, observing that there
had been no change in the use of the space for fishing
but that there had been a decrease in the
community’s dependence on local fish for
commercial purposes, along with a decrease in fish
consumption and in local fish resources. However,
the continuous use of the fishing spots for more than
10 yr is similar to what was observed for Búzios
Island, located on the northern coast of São Paulo,
and for Sepetiba Bay, on the coast of Rio de Janeiro
State (Begossi 2001a).
Picinguaba, a small beach located inside the Serra
do Mar State Park, is inhabited by more than 100
families. Its population includes tourists and
middle-class retirees, or persons who have migrated
in an attempt to get away from life in huge
southeastern Brazilian cities such as São Paulo;
some of them are seeking a different life-style. In
1991–1992, four different types of fishing were
found there: (1) the cerco, known to the Japanese
as kaku-ami, a floating net that is disposed in a circle,
marked with bamboo, and visited twice a day; (2)
set gillnet fishing in paddled canoes; (3) hook and
line fishing in the small local rivers of Rio da
Fazenda and Rio Picinguaba; and (4) fishing
embarcado, which means contractual fishing in
trawlers from the cities of Santos and Rio de Janeiro,
i.e., industrial fishing.
When I returned to Picinguaba in 2003, the small
beach had been transformed into a narrow strip of
sand. Canoe shelters were built there after the fishers
sold their previous shelters, now vacation houses,
to tourists (Fig. 6). Local fishing with the cerco and
with set gillnets is still performed by a few fishers,
but the absence of local fishers using paddled or
motorized canoes for local fishing was noticeable.
This community has suffered strong pressure from
local environmental agencies to suspend fishing
activities because it is located inside a State Park,
with additional pressure from the external tourist
economy that accompanies middle-class homeowners.
Such pressures are also emphasized in other studies
in Picinguaba (Masumoto 2003). In this study, data
were obtained from two informants in Picinguaba.
One of the informants gathered data from just two
spots and Rapada Island. The fishing spots are
located close to the islands facing Picinguaba Beach
(Fig. 7).
In light of such results, I decided to mark the spots
on the neighboring beach to the south, i.e., Almada-
Engenho Beach, locally called Almada, which was
studied earlier by Hanazaki (1997), Hanazaki and
Begossi (2000), and Hanazaki et al. (1996, 2000).
This community, in spite of being so close to
Picinguaba (Fig. 7), is located outside the park
boundaries. It has an active fishing community,
including a local organization that has been taking
strict care of the beach with regard to cleanliness,
an uncommon procedure on Brazilian beaches (Fig.
8). The spots used by this community were marked;
Fig. 7 shows how fishers from Almada approach the
area of Picinguaba. The informal division of spots
was not in place in this case, probably because of
the absence of local fishers in Picinguaba.
Therefore, the criteria for stability in the use of these
fishing spots appear to be associated with a right of
use that is respected because of an effective fishing
practice. The restrictions on fishing in the State Park
seem to be a pressure that might disrupt an ongoing
Ecology and Society 11(1): 5
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art5/
Fig. 5. Fishing spots marked at Puruba Beach, Ubatuba, São Paulo State, in 2003.
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Fig. 6. Picinguaba Beach, located within the limits of the Serra do Mar State Park, São Paulo State.
process of division of resources and of incipient
local management. Seixas and Futemma (personal
communication) are currently carrying out research
dealing specifically with territories and institutional
changes in Almada and its neighboring beaches.
DISCUSSION
The management of small-scale fisheries in
developing countries such as Brazil faces obstacles
because of the unavailability of data on fish
landings, among other things, and because of the
fact that many artisanal fisheries are located near
protected areas and subject to restrictions on their
subsistence or economic activities. For example,
Puruba Beach is located in an area that is adjacent
to the Serra do Mar State Park, Parque Estadual da
Serra do Mar, and Picinguaba is located within the
limits of this state park. Although the effort to
promote co-management through extractive
reserves, for instance, in inhabited Brazilian parks
has been one of the strategies of the state or federal
government agencies, this effort has, with a few
exceptions, been based on top-down approaches
(Begossi and Brown 2003, Begossi 2004a). There
are, of course, particular cases in which fishers were
given political space and a chance to experiment, as
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Fig. 7. Fishing spots marked at Picinguaba by two informants in 2003, and at Almada-Engenho Beaches,
São Paulo State in 2004.
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Fig. 8. Almada Beach, located outside of the boundaries of the Serra do Mar State Park, São Paulo State.
was the case with the fishers from Ibiraquera
Lagoon in southern Brazil (Seixas and Berkes
2003). However, even in this case, the top-down
approach to decision making practiced by state and
federal government agencies has been emphasized
(Seixas 2004a). In the southern Patos Lagoon in
Brazil, Kalikoski et al. (2002) analyzed such top-
down behavior, including the lack of incentives for
and official intolerance of small-scale fishers.
In Brazil, the federal agency that addresses co-
management, the National Center for Traditional
Populations and Sustainable Development (CNPT)
of the Brazilian Institute for Environment and
Natural Renewable Resources (IBAMA), collectively
referred to as CNPT-IBAMA, has attempted to
organize extractive reserves along the southeastern
Brazilian coast in spite of fishers' opinions. The
IBAMA, using the “Extractive Reserve” slogan, has
launched top-down initiatives such as the extractive
reserves in marine coastal areas, often without local
support. In these coastal fisheries, the fishers
sometimes find themselves involved in processes
for the creation of extractive reserves without
knowing what kind of institution this novelty
represents or understanding the implications of
institutional changes and management rules. Itaipu
Beach illustrates such a case (Begossi 2004a). As
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Fig. 9. Local newspaper, O Jornal da Região, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro State.
seen in Fig. 9, the newspaper Jornal da Região 
featured a story on a local fisher movement against
the transformation of the beach into an extractive
reserve. Local fishers argued that they had no
information on the objectives or the functions of
such reserves, among other issues.
Territoriality, institutions, and co-management
Institutions are sets of rights and obligations,
including the system of property rights, laws,
contracts, and norms. Transaction costs are the costs
of enforcing those rights, obligations, and
agreements. They include search and bargaining
costs such as the costs of negotiations (van der Burg
2000). Within fisheries, transaction costs are usually
high because of the uncertainty of the environment
and the supply. Nielsen (2003) divided management
transaction costs within fisheries into four types: (1)
information costs such as data collection and
research; (2) decision-making costs such as rule
making, fishing rights, and regulations; (3)
operational costs or the costs of undertaking fishing
activities; and (4) monitoring, control, and
enforcement costs, which are determined by the
complexity of applicable regulations and by how
legitimate these regulations can be for fishers. As
suggested by Hanna (2003), a bottom-up approach
increases transaction costs such as the cost of
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information, collective decisions, and collective
operations. Considering that most management of
artisanal fishing in Brazil has been represented by
top-down initiatives from the federal government,
the cost of implementation should not be as high,
but the cost of monitoring and enforcement should
be much higher. Many studies have examined such
top-down, centralized management in Brazil,
including Begossi (2004a), Begossi and Brown
(2003), Kalikoski and Satterfield (2004), Seixas
(2004b), and Silva (2004). Seixas (2004b) analyzed
four case studies in Brazil: the Ceará Reservoir
Project in the northeast, the Maritime Extractive
Reserve in Arraial do Cabo in the southeast, the
Lagoa dos Patos Forum, and the Lagoa de Ibiraquera
Project in the south. She found common features in
all four cases, such as the lack of government
support or recognition of co-management
institutions, the users’ lack of trust in governmental
agencies, and barriers for participatory research and
management such as the marginalization of artisanal
fishers, the culture of patron-client relations, and
corruption, among others. In a study of the maritime
extractive reserve of Arraial do Cabo, Silva (2004)
analyzed maritime extractive reserves that were
created by the central government. She noted
ineffective monitoring systems and negative
interactions between fishers and the government,
especially when represented by the IBAMA, an
organization that fishers feel is riddled with
corruption and inefficiency. These are examples in
which transaction costs have been very high
following the implementation of co-management
systems, because in the maritime extractive reserves
there is little trust in government initiatives, minimal
participatory involvement in the co-management
design and projects, and little empowerment.
Nielsen et al. (2004) observed that one of the main
reasons for the lack of success of the modern
fisheries management approach was that the top-
down approach left fishing communities completely
out of the process.
Part of the transaction costs on the southeastern
Brazilian coast derives from a lack of local
organizations compared to other areas such as
Amazonian rivers (Begossi 1998b). The artisanal
fishers of the Amazon and the Atlantic Forest coast
have much in common, including their
technologies, the use of paddled canoes, their high-
biodiversity environments, and their interactions
with the forest (Begossi 2004b). On the other hand,
in the Amazon, there are examples of relatively
successful co-management regimes such as the
Mamirauá State Reserve and the federal Upper
Juruá Extractive Reserve created from a historical
local movement (Begossi 1998b, 2002, Begossi et
al. 1999, Begossi and Brown 2003). However, the
government’s proposal to create a maritime
extractive reserve at Itaipu Beach, which was
rejected by local fishers and by the local association,
illustrates a coastal case in which there is a viable
local organization, including the first president
elected by the Colônia de Pescadores (Barbosa et
al. 2004). In addition, local fishers felt the necessity
to be aware, and part, of an institutional change that
would directly affect their lives and shift the power
of decision making from the local, i.e., association
and municipality, to the federal level, i.e., the
IBAMA.
Management is a local exercise that should use local
rules and institutions. Berkes (2002) suggested that
the replacement of local institutions by centralized
ones should involve a change in the way knowledge
is used for management. He observed that the shift
in knowledge systems is one of the major impacts
of government-level institutions, because it is
accompanied by a change in control over resources.
Fishers from Itaipu Beach at least seemed aware that
changes could not be in the direction they wanted.
Of course, there are many possible management
arrangements. For general examples of designs and
arrangements of co-management regimes, see
Ostrom et al. (2002), and, for examples within
fisheries, see Sen and Nielsen (1996) and Wilson et
al. (2003). McCay (2002) used the concept of
“embeddedness” to emphasize the need for fine-
grained, long-term historical and ethnographic
research on common-pool resource situations and
their contexts. The existence of institutions,
according to this author, can lower transaction costs.
Jentoft (2005) suggested that empowerment is
enabling and authorizing, and that fishers would be
empowered when institutions facilitate their
participation and secure their rights. Empowerment
of artisanal coastal fishers in Brazil would involve
current local rules, local knowledge, and local
organizations, along with the ability to see the
resulting co-management institution as the product
of participatory co-management projects and not as
an a priori institution, already established and
designed. As highlighted by Pomeroy et al. (2001)
in a review of co-management projects in Asia,
empowerment allows communities to be free from
many of the bureaucratic requirements of
government’s central administrative agencies. This
type of flexibility generally facilitates the control
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and management by communities of the resource
and resource users.
Forms of diminishing transaction costs include the
use of current local knowledge and customary rules
to build up co-management processes. Ruddle
(2000) described the local knowledge of coastal
fishers and emphasized its importance for modern
management. Other authors (Berkes 1985, 1999,
Berkes et al. 2001) have analyzed local knowledge
and its applications for the management of fisheries
as well as for other systems. The informal division
in the use of fishing spots, indicating a division of
resources that avoids overlap in the exploitation of
marine areas in Brazil, was demonstrated in earlier
studies (Begossi 2001a,b, Begossi and Brown
2003), and the temporal stability of such a division
is shown in this study. Existing rules of this type
could form a basis for co-management.
According to Jentoft (2003), existing institutional
structures can be used for co-management, new
management institutions must be related to existing
institutions, and co-management should not be
created in an institutional vacuum. The management
of resources may also be seen as an “institutional
problem” (Acheson 2000), and, considering the
reality in Third World or developing countries,
corruption is regarded as one of the causes of
government failure, along with the disinterest of the
state and the high transaction costs of monitoring
enforcement. Institutional approaches to co-
management are known from the literature, and they
include analysis of collective actions (Ostrom 1990,
Ostrom et. al. 2002). Examples of collective actions
and successes in co-management are provided by
some of the Amazonian fisheries in Brazil, such as
the Mamirauá Sustainable Reserve and São Miguel
Island on the Lower Amazon River, which were
successful in managing pirarucu (Arapaima gigas)
by monitoring and using local knowledge and local
fishers (Queiroz and Crampton 1999, Padoch et al.
1999, Begossi 2002, Castro 2004). The Pacific coast
has also experienced some success with co-
management projects, e.g., the analysis given by
Hickey and Johannes (2002) of local management
in Vanuatu. Others, such as Ruttan (1998), observed
that resources might be best managed collectively,
rather than privately, illustrating such an approach
by studying the management of Trochus in Maluku,
Indonesia.
Among other aspects, the obstacles to be overcome
in managing such small-scale local fisheries are
based on the weak capability to exclude outsiders
such as industrial fishers or tourists. The behavior
observed by industrial fishers who use large to
medium-sized boats and, according to the local
inhabitants, spend part of their lives working
embarcado, i.e., outside the village in a fishing boat,
could serve as an illustrative comparative example.
One of the informants, a fisher from Picinguaba,
works sporadically embarcado, staying about a
week at sea in a 5–12 t boat and fishing with lines
and nets. On 22 October 2003, the locations of the
fishing spots he was able to mark with a GPS from
the boat (Fig. 10) were made available. The 365
spots marked and fished from his boat showed that
a long distance is covered, from the middle of São
Paulo State up to the city of Rio de Janeiro. In
Picinguaba, Masumoto (2003) also showed that
industrial fishers, in this case represented by three
owners of four boats at Picinguaba, used spots from
the coast of São Paulo to the coast of Rio de Janeiro
State. What is still uncertain is the extent to which
industrial fishers are entering the area of artisanal
fishers, because some argue that the former fish in
deeper waters than the latter.
The invasion of riverine or shore waters by
industrial fishers was observed in the Amazon by
Petrere (1989), McGrath et el. (1993), and Castro
et al. (2002), and on the southeastern coast by
Begossi (1995, 2001a, 2004a), Seixas and Begossi
(1998), and Kalikoski et al. (2002). Considering that
an informal division of fishing spots is already in
effect among coastal Brazilian fishers (Begossi
2001a,b), the temporal stability of fishing spots is
a factor that could provide strong support to local
management of the fisheries through the reservation
of areas for artisanal fishing. The robustness of this
stability is evident in the fact that the location of the
spots did not move, in spite of technological changes
at Valença, Bahia, e.g., a switch from fishing with
the rede de calão to the increased use of the redinha 
for catching shrimp. Moreover, despite the
advanced urbanization of Itaipu Beach, Niterói, the
spots used are still the same. Of course, the effects
of future changes in fishing technology or even
increased industrialization and tourism on the use
of the fishing space are hard to predict.
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the
maintenance of such stability seems, in a certain
form, strictly associated with the day-to-day
reinforcement of the fishing spots through the use
of the spots by the fishers, as shown in the example
of the Almada-Picinguaba interaction in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 10. Fishing spots used by 5–12 t boats, marked by a fisher from Picinguaba. Data were obtained by a
fisher who uses lines and nets in a boat that stays out of Picinguaba for about a week. Data included 365
fishing spots.
Complexity and institutional arrangements
Fisheries in Japan have had marine area reserves in
their civil code for artisanal inshore fisheries since
1902 (Akimichi and Ruddle 1984), because, at that
time, the village sea territories that were established
during the feudal era had already been mapped. In
the case of the Brazilian coast, where there is an
informal division of sea space among local artisanal
fishers and where we found a long temporal stability
in the use of these spots, a management solution for
these fisheries might be to reserve or to designate
these areas for artisanal fishing. Designated areas
of this type could be used to support the local fishers’
claims against outsiders (Begossi 1995). Such a
solution, i.e., areas designated for local fisheries
based on the fishing spots used, if supported by the
Colônias de Pescadores or associations of fishers,
might also grow into co-management institutions,
starting with fisher participation based on existing
rules. Acheson and Wilson (1996) observed that, at
seven fisheries in which management is influenced
by science and managed by the central government
and in 29 societies in which there is a strong basis
for folk-management techniques, resources are
managed by political institutions that have riparian
rights over coastal areas, i.e., a rule or regulation
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can apply only within the territory of a group willing
and able to enforce it.
In terms of political and institutional changes, less
complex institutional arrangements, such as the
demarcation of fishing space for artisanal fishers,
might represent a realistic way to incorporate local
rules. Such a solution could include the demarcation
of the fishing space for each community,
considering that an incipient division of the space
already exists and that it is relatively stable in time.
This type of institution does not shift the local power
to a central power such as federal environmental
agencies, as occurs in the maritime extractive
reserves. Less complex institutional arrangements
already exist in the Amazon with regard to the co-
management of Amazonian lakes in the form of
"fishing accords" (McGrath et al. 1993, Castro
2000, Castro and McGrath 2001, Begossi and
Brown 2003), and include rules based on customary
laws. In the Amazon, conflicts between local fishers
and commercial fisheries gave rise to formal
mechanisms for controlling fishery resources, with
the historical support of the Amazonian Catholic
Church (Castro et al. 2002). These authors analyzed
the fishing accord for the Island of São Miguel on
the Amazon River. The accord, established 25 yr
ago, included four stages: (1) the old fishing strategy
was affected by the intensification of regional
fisheries; (2) an incipient fishing management
scheme was established; (3) the fishery rules were
improved to solve emerging problems; and (4) the
community is currently extending a net to external
communities, assuming the commercialization of
fish as part of the management system. Other
examples are provided by the lake management
system on the Solimôes River in the Tefé region, in
which 330 lakes are managed by 26 communities,
each of which has different categories for the lakes,
e.g., fish procreation, sanctuaries, conservation,
subsistence fishing, and free access (Oliveira and
Cunha 2002).
Complexity represents an important obstacle to
resource management (Poteete and Wilch 2004).
Considering that management can be an exercise in
collective institutional development, the cited
authors analyzed how important the complexity of
a resource is for collective action to manage forest
resources. In the case of fisheries, the use of existing
institutions could reduce the complexity of change
in the institutional arrangements, the transaction
costs, and the difficulties in monitoring the
management process. The fishing accords
mentioned in the context of the lake system on the
Amazon floodplain might serve as an example of a
way to reduce complexity and increase the power
of co-management systems.
CONCLUSIONS
The results shown here suggest that local
management in the form of co-management does
not necessarily apply in complex institutional
reorganizations as long as there are customary rules
in place. In the case of the coastal fishers in Brazil,
there is a spatial arrangement under an informal
division of spots (Begossi 2001a,b, Begossi and
Brown 2003) that has proven to be stable over time,
as observed in the present study. Therefore, the local
rules for co-management are straightforward, and
in this case co-management might represent the
state’s recognition of the rights of local artisanal
fishers over the use of these fishing areas.
However, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the
informal division of spots, their local use, and their
stability over time is supporting sustainable
fisheries. For example, at Puruba Beach, a decrease
in the number and diversity of fish landings was
observed by Lopes (2004). Nevertheless, one of the
main obstacles to the analysis of the sustainability
of Brazilian fisheries is the lack of data on fish
landings. One might speculate to what extent the
relatively low density of artisanal fishers on the
southeast Brazilian coast, especially those who fish
in paddled or motorized canoes, contributes to the
sustainability of these artisanal fisheries. On the
other hand, despite the nonoverlapping use of
fishing spots observed among resident fishers,
tourism and industrial fishing may disrupt the
process if there is no control or monitoring of these
activities. In spite of the assertion that industrial
fishers are located in deeper waters, there is a real
possibility that they could and do invade artisanal
fishing waters. Figure 10 shows such an example,
and it is not uncommon to observe trawlers and large
boats very close to shore.
The temporal stability observed in the use of fishing
spots among fishers from the southeastern Atlantic
Forest coast could be, on its own, a solid justification
for using local institutions to support local
management: stability of this type shows that, over
a period of 10–30 yr, there has been no sequential
exploitation of spots, i.e., by adding other spots from
neighboring beaches or by looking for more distant
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spots. For example, the Rasa and Redonda Islands
in Rio de Janeiro are distant spots, still used
sporadically by Copacabana and Itaipu fishers. The
case of Almada-Picinguaba beaches, shown in Fig.
7, appears to be a result of a vacant space left by
Picinguaba fishers. By not adding other spots, this
type of behavior maintains a division in the use of
the marine space and a local characteristic in the
exploitation of resources from each of the fisheries
studied; such features contribute to the
sustainability of the local fisheries. Briefly, the
perspectives obtained through the results of this
study are that:
● the stability of spots and their local
exploitation by resident fishers deserve
attention and could be used to manage the
fishery for the benefit of local users;
 
● the management and control of other users
such as tourists, boats, and trawlers should be
settled in a way that allows the local artisanal
fisheries to continue;
 
● it would be worthwhile to know if temporal
changes occur in the productivity of the main
spots used for fishing. Monitoring some spots
reserved for local coastal artisanal fishers and
other spots shared with other users, e.g.,
tourists, would be an interesting way to track
the sustainability of these fisheries; and
 
● studies of the ways in which medium-sized
boats, i.e., 5–12 t, and industrial fishers use
marine space should be carried out to
determine if they are also fishing in the spots
normally used by local artisanal fishers.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art5/responses/
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